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Abstract. Preference-based systems (p.b.s.) describe interactions be-
tween nodes of a system that can rank their neighbors. Previous work
has shown that p.b.s. converge to a unique locally stable matching if an
acyclicity property is veriﬁed. In the following we analyze acyclic p.b.s.
with respect to the self-stabilization theory. We prove that the round
complexity is bounded by n2 for the adversarial daemon. The step com-
plexity is equivalent to n
2
4 for the round robin daemon, and exponential
for the general adversarial daemon.
Keywords: Preference-based systems, b-matching, acyclicity, round
robin, adversarial and round robin daemons.
1 Introduction
A system is called preference-based if each of its nodes selﬁshly tries to acti-
vate its best edges according to some personal ranking. The description of the
stable conﬁgurations — if any — of a p.b.s. is known as the stable b-matching
problem. b-matching theory and its variants have applications in a variety of
real-world situations, including dating agencies, college admissions, roommates
attributions, assignment of graduating medical students to their ﬁrst hospital
appointment, or kidney exchanges programs [1,2,3,4,5].
Recently, Lebedev et al. showed that many preferences are acyclic. They
also proved that an acyclic p.b.s. has a unique stable conﬁguration, and al-
ways stabilizes[6,7]. This convergence result gave a theoretical proof for up-
load/download correlations in incentive-based networks like BitTorrent [8].
Our contribution is to analyze the convergence properties of acyclic p.b.s.
by using the self-stabilization approach [9,10]. We use the convergence theorem
proved in [6] to compute the step and round complexities for the round robin
and the adversarial daemon.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a short
introduction to the p.b.s. model and present the convergence theorem. In Sec-
tion 3 we give the round complexity. The step complexity for the round robin
and adversarial daemons are presented in Section 4.
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2 Model
A preference-based system consists of a set V of n nodes, whose possible inter-
actions are described by an acceptance graph G and a set of rankings (<i)i∈V .
The acceptance graph G = (V,E) is an undirected graph. It describes com-
patibilities: a node i and a node j are capable of collaborating (we say that i is
acceptable for j, and vice versa) if, and only if (iﬀ) {i, j} ∈ E.
The ranking <i of a node i is a total order on the neighbors of i. If j and k
are two distinct neighbors of i, then we say that i prefers j to k iﬀ j <i k.
Preference-based systems are also characterized by a quota vector b: a node
i cannot sustain more that b(i) simultaneous collaborations1. In this paper, we
focus on the case b = 1, thus the state of collaborations at a given time is a
matching of G, that we call conﬁguration. C(i) denotes the match of a node i,
if any, in a conﬁguration C.
The only action allowed in the model is the resolution of blocking pairs. A
blocking pair is a pair of nodes that are not matched together, in which both
could gain by collaborating (even if it means dropping the current match). A
conﬁguration with no blocking pair is stable.
We say that a node is eligible in a conﬁguration if it belongs to at least one
blocking pair. In this paper, we only consider best-match resolution: the action
of an eligible node consists in choosing the node it prefers among the blocking
pairs to which it belongs.
A computation is a maximal sequence of conﬁgurations such that for each
conﬁguration Ci, the next conﬁguration Ci+1 is obtained by the action of one
eligible node in Ci. Maximality of a computation means that the computation is
inﬁnite or it terminates in a conﬁguration where none of the actions are enabled,
e.g. a stable conﬁguration.
A daemon is an action scheduler that generates a computation. We consider
here two kinds of daemons: the round robin daemon follows a round robin
scheduling over V , and executes the action of i whenever i is selected by the
scheduler and eligible; the adversarial daemon may select any eligible node at
every step. The adversarial daemon encompasses the round robin.
2.1 Convergence Theorem for Acyclic p.b.s.
A preference cycle is a cycle of nodes i1,. . . ,ik, with k ≥ 3, such that each node ij
prefers its successor ij+1 to its predecessor ij−1 (ij+1 <ij ij−1). A p.b.s. without
any preference cycle is called acyclic.
A particular kind of acyclic p.b.s. are the global-preferences systems, where
the preferences come from an inherent total order. For any global-preferences
system, there exists a labeling i1, . . . , in of its nodes such that for any node ij
with distinct neighbors ik and il, ik <ij il is equivalent to k < l. So, for sake of
simplicity, the nodes of a global-preferences system are often labeled with the
integers 1 to n.
1 The b letter in b-matching stands for this quota vector.
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In [6], Lebedev et al. proved that an acyclic p.b.s. has a unique stable con-
ﬁguration, and that all computations are ﬁnite. In other word, for any starting
conﬁguration, the adversarial daemon eventually converges to the stable conﬁg-
uration. Thus we can say that acyclic p.b.s. are self-stabilizing for their stable
conﬁguration.
Strong pairs. Strong pairs are a central concept in acyclic preference-based sys-
tems. A pair is strong in a conﬁguration if:
– each node of the pair is ranked ﬁrst by the other,
– or if there is one or more nodes that are ranked better, each of them is
matched and forms a strong pair with its mate.
Strong pairs have many qualities (cf [6,7] for details):
– they are edges of the stable conﬁguration,
– a strong blocking pair is stable until the pair is matched (the property is not
aﬀected by any daemon),
– the best-match resolution of any of the two nodes of a strong blocking pair
matches these two nodes,
– once matched, a strong blocking pair is a stable matched pair,
– all non-stable conﬁgurations of a given acyclic p.b.s. admit at least one strong
blocking pair.
Using strong blocking pairs, the question we will address in the following
is the eﬀective time complexity of the convergence under possibly adversarial
scheduling regimes. We consider two measures for evaluating this complexity.
The round complexity and the step complexity. A round is a sub-sequence of
a computation in which every node that was eligible at the beginning of the
round either is activated or ceases to be eligible during the round. The step
complexity investigates the maximum length of a computation for all possible
starting conﬁgurations.
3 Round complexity
The round complexity is simple to compute in the case of acyclic p.b.s., as shown
by theorem 1:
Theorem 1. Starting from any configuration, and under any daemon, an acyclic
preference-based system stabilizes in n2  rounds. Furthermore, there are instances
where the round robin daemon requires n2  rounds.
Proof. The proof comes from the existence of strong blocking pairs in acyclic
preference-based systems: after each round (until stabilization), we are sure that
at least a a node of a strong blocking pair is selected, thus a stable edge is
formed. As the stable conﬁguration is a matching, it has at most n2  edges, so
the stabilization cannot last more than n2  rounds. This bound is tight because
it is reached for global preferences and complete acceptance graph, if we consider
the round robin daemon with scheduling n, (n − 1), . . . , 2, 1, starting from the
empty conﬁguration C∅.
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4 Step Complexity
In [6], the proof of the existence of a stable conﬁguration relies on the following:
in an acyclic p.b.s., all conﬁgurations of a given computation are distinct. Thus
a ﬁrst upper bound for the step complexity is the maximal number of matchings
of a graph with n nodes. This number, also known as the number of involutions
of a set of size n, has a factorial-like asymptotic behavior [11]. In the follow-
ing we prove a tight quadratic bound for the round robin daemon and a tight
exponential bound for the adversarial daemon.
4.1 Round Robin Daemon
The step complexity for the round robin daemon is given by theorem 2:
Theorem 2. Starting from any configuration, the round robin daemon takes at
most
∑n2 −1
k=0 (n − (2k + 1)) steps to converge (hence the complexity is equivalent
to n
2
4 ). This bound is tight.
Proof. The reasoning is the same as for the round complexity. As long as the
current conﬁguration is not stable, there exists at least two nodes that belong to
a strong blocking pair. Hence after at most n− 1 steps, the round robin daemon
is forced to match a strong blocking pair. The remaining non stable nodes are
less than n − 2, and if the conﬁguration is not stable yet, at least two of them
form a strong blocking pair, so after at most n − 3 steps, a new stable edge is
formed. . .
If we continue this process, we see that the number of steps cannot be more
than
(n − 1) + (n − 3) + (n − 5)... =
n2 −1∑
k=0
(n − (2k + 1)) .
This is equal to n
2
4 + c, where c is − 14 when n is odd and 0 when n is even.
Like for the round complexity, one can see that this bound is reached for
global preferences and complete acceptance graph, if we consider the round robin
daemon with scheduling n, (n − 1), . . . , 2, 1, starting from C∅.
4.2 Adversarial Daemon
The step complexity is harder to compute for the adversarial daemon. First we
will prove that the step complexity is not greater than 2n−1 − 1. Then we will
introduce a daemon with complexity Ω(μn), with μ ≈ 1.6826, thus proving that
the complexity of the adversarial daemon stands somewhere between these two
bounds.
2n Upper Bound
Theorem 3. The number of steps under any daemon is less than 2n−1 − 1 for
an acyclic preference-based system for all possible initial configurations.
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Proof. We need to introduce S(n, k), that denotes the maximal number of steps
that can be made by using only a ﬁxed subset of size k of the nodes of an acyclic
system of length n (the system and its initial conﬁguration are arbitrary). S(n, n)
is the maximal complexity, so we want to prove that S(n, n) ≤ 2n−1 − 1.
Let C be an initial conﬁguration of a system of size n. If C is not stable, C
admits at least one strong blocking pair. Thus any computation can be split in
three subsequences: before, during, and after the resolution of the strong blocking
pair. The two nodes of the strong blocking pair cannot be selected before or after
the pair is resolved, so we have:
S(n, n) ≤ S(n, n − 2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
before resolution
+ 1︸︷︷︸
resolution
+ S(n, n − 2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
after resolution
Now, we need to express S(n, k) for 1 ≤ k < n. First, we have S(n, 1) = 1,
because a single node i cannot be eligible after a selection: it is matched with the
best node j it can (it cannot prefer the possible previous mate k of j, otherwise
{i, j, k} would be a preference cycle).
For 2 ≤ k < n, call A the set of nodes that can be selected, I the set of nodes
that cannot be selected. One of the two following propositions is true:
– there exists a node in A that is never eligible as long as only nodes of A are
selected,
– there exists a pair in A × A or in A × I that is strong with respect to the
action of nodes from A.
In order to prove that, we consider the following path construction scheme:
the successor, if any, of a node a in A is deﬁned as the best choice for a that does
not belong to a pair of I stable under the actions of A (stable nodes internal to
I cannot interfere with other nodes, so one forget them). The successor of a non-
stable node of I is its best choice among its neighbors from A plus its possible
current neighbor. Note that a non stable node of I has always a successor.
Starting from an initial node a0, one construct a path using this scheme. The
successor of each node is the best node it can expect under the action of A.
Because the system is acyclic and ﬁnite, the path eventually ends with a node
without successor, or with two nodes j, k such that each one is the successor of
the other.
If the path ends with a node without successor, this node belongs to A, and
it cannot be eligible (its non-stable-neighbors list is empty). If it ends with two
reciprocal successors i and j, then {i, j} is strong under the action of A, and it
belongs to A × A or A × I ({i, j} ∈ I2 would imply that {i, j} is a matched pair
of I that is stable under the action of A).
We can now bound S(n, k), using the same before/during/after argument than
for S(n, n):
S(n, k) ≤
⎧
⎨
⎩
S(n, k − 1) if a node from A is never eligible,
1 + 2S(n, k − 2) if a pair from A2 is strong with respect to A,
1 + 2S(n, k − 1) if a pair from A × I is strong with respect to A.
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In any case, we have S(n, k) ≤ 1 + 2S(n, k − 1) for 2 ≤ k < n. An immediate
recurrence gives S(n, n − 2) ≤ 2n−2 − 1, thus we have S(n, n) ≤ 2n−1 − 1. This
concludes the proof.
μn Lower Bound
Theorem 4. There exists an acyclic preference-based system and a daemon
such that the complexity is Ω(μN ), with
μ =
√
√
√
√
3
√
316 + 12
√
249
6
+
20
3 3
√
316 + 12
√
249
+
2
3
≈ 1.683
Proof. As the complexity is obviously increasing with n, we can restrain the
proof to systems of even size. We consider a global-preferences system of size
N = 2n with complete acceptance graph.
The worst eligible daemon (w.e.d.) is deﬁned, for global preference systems,
as follows: as long as there exists an eligible node, the daemon select the worst-
eligible node, i.e. the eligible node with the highest label.
Call TC the number of steps taken by the w.e.d. to reach the stable conﬁgu-
ration from an initial conﬁguration C (the number of nodes and the knowledge
graph are implicit). T∅(n) stands for TC∅(n), where C∅(n) is the empty conﬁg-
uration in the complete graph with 2n nodes. T12(n) stands for TC12(n), where
C12(n) is the stable conﬁguration in the complete graph with 2n nodes, except
the best pair, {1, 2}, is not matched.
We will prove that T∅(n) = Θ(λn), with λ = μ2. This will guarantee that
the complexity of the adversarial worst-eligible daemon is Ω(μN ) (other initial
conﬁgurations may take more steps).
T∅ can be expressed as a recursive function of T12. This shown by Equation (1).
T∅(n) = n2 +
n−1∑
i=1
(n − i)T12(i) (1)
For proving (1), we need to understand how the w.e.d. performs from C∅. The
basic idea is that at each step of the w.e.d., nodes can be split according to a
pivot. Nodes above the pivot or matched with those form the upper part. Other
nodes form the lower part. Upper nodes are never selected by the daemon, while
lower nodes perform the w.e.d. in a recursive way, with little change on upper
part conﬁguration. The pivot increases one by one until the stable conﬁguration
is reached.
We start with C∅ where all nodes are single.
{2n}, {2n − 1}, . . . , {n + 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, {n}, . . . , {2}, {1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
upper part
First, 2n goes with 1. 2n is not eligible, so 2n−1 is selected and takes 1 from 2n,
that goes to 2. Then 2n−2 matches with 1, forcing 2n−1 to lower its matching,
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cascading to 2n. After n(n+1)2 steps, the w.e.d. reaches the conﬁguration where
each node of the lower part is matched with a node of the upper part as follows:
{2n, n︸︷︷︸
lowest eligible node
}, {2n − 1, n − 1}, . . . , {n + 2, 2}, {n + 1, 1}
At this point, all nodes from what we have called the lower part are not
eligible. So the ﬁrst upper node, n, is selected and becomes the pivot, leading to
the conﬁguration
{2n}, {n + 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, {2n − 1, n − 1}, . . . , {n + 2, 2}, {n, 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
upper part
The lower part ({2n}, {n + 1}) performs T∅(1) = T12(1) (in other words, 2n
matches with n + 1), then n + 1 swaps with n + 2 as 2’s mate. The lower part
is now {2n}, {n + 2} and performs T12(1), then n + 2 swaps with n + 3 as 3’s
mate, and so on. . . Eventually, 2n − 2 swaps with 2n − 1 as n − 1’s mate and 2n
matches with 2n − 1, resulting in the following conﬁguration :
{2n, 2n − 1}, {2n − 2, n − 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lowest eligible node
}, {2n − 3, n − 2}, . . . , {n + 1, 2}, {n, 1}
Now n − 1 is the lowest eligible node (l.e.n.) and becomes the pivot.
More generally, the conﬁguration before 2 ≤ i ≤ n becomes the pivot is
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 2, 2i + 1}, {2i, i︸︷︷︸
l.e.n.
}, . . . , {i + 2, 2}, {i + 1, 1}
After i is selected, we obtain
{2n, 2n−1}, . . . , {2i+2, 2i+1}, {2i}, {i+ 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, {2i − 1, i − 1} . . . , {i + 2, 2}, {i, 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
upper part
The upper part needs will mutate i−1 times (including i’s selection) to become
{2i − 2, i − 1} . . . , {i + 1, 2}, {i, 1}
Each mutation is due to the selection of the highest node from the lower part.
This is what we call a transitional step (selection of a lower part node to match
with an upper part node). After a transitional step, the lower part is made of
2(n − i + 1) nodes; More precisely 2(n − i) nodes perform a local {2k, 2k − 1}
matching, while the two best nodes (of the lower part) are single. As only the
best node of the lower part can interact with the upper part and as the w.e.d.
never selects the best node, the lower part will perform T12(n−i+1) steps before
the next transitional step. To summarize, the w.e.d. computation, starting from
C∅ is made of:
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– n(n+1)2 steps to match each node of the upper half to a node of the lower
half.
– for each pivot i (n ≤ i ≤ 2), i−1 transitional steps, and (i−1)T12(n− i+1)
low steps.
That leads to Equation (1) :
T∅(n)=
n(n+1)
2 +
∑n
i=2(i − 1)(1 + T12(n − i + 1))
=n(n+1)2 +
n(n−1)
2 +
∑n−1
i=1 (n − i)T12(i)
=n2 +
∑n−1
i=1 (n − i)T12(i)
Now that we have an expression of T∅ that depends on T12, we need to specify
the behavior of T12. This is given by Equation (2).
T12(n) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if n < 1
1 if n = 1
4
(
n − 1 + ∑n−3i=1 T12(i)
)
+ 3T12(n − 2) + T12(n − 1) if n > 1
(2)
For n ≤ 1, (2) is obvious. For n ≥ 2, we adapt (1)’s proof. The w.e.d. ﬁrst
matches all upper nodes, then combinatorics can be made using transitional
and low steps derived from a pivot. The main diﬀerence is that due to pre-
existing upper matchings, we need to distinguish odd and even pivots. Now, let
us describe the diﬀerent phases of the w.e.d. computation starting from C12 :
Initial phase. First 2n matches 1, 2n−1 matches 1 and 2n matches 2. So after
3 steps, nodes form the conﬁguration
{2n − 2, 2n − 3}, . . . , {4, 3}, {2n, 2}, {2n− 1, 1}
Our ﬁrst pivot will be 2n − 2 (even).
Even pivot. The conﬁguration before 2i (n− 1 ≤ i ≤ 2)2 becomes the pivot is:
{2n, 2n−1}, . . . , {2i+4, 2i+3}, {2i, 2i−1}, . . . , {4, 3}, {2i+2, 2}, {2i+1, 1}
After 2i is selected, we obtain
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4, 2i + 3}, {2i + 1}, {2i − 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i + 2, 2}, {2i, 1}
The lower part is made of 2(n − i) nodes that form a C12 conﬁguration (the
two best nodes, 2i + 1 and 2i − 1, are single). Low transitions occurs until
the second best node (2i+1) is selected and matches with 2. In other words,
after T12(n−i)−T12(n−i−1) transitions (we count the T12(n−i) transitions
2 We treat the pivot 2 separately.
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except we remove transitions that happens after node 2 is selected) we obtain
the conﬁguration
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4}, {2i + 2}, {2i + 3, 2i − 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i + 1, 2}, {2i, 1}
The lower part conﬁguration is similar to C12(n− i) except for the four best
nodes3 : ﬁrst and third nodes (2i − 1 and 2i + 3) are together, while second
and fourth nodes are single. The w.e.d. ﬁrst performs the stable solution for
the lower part minus 2i − 1 and 2i + 3 in T12(n − i − 1) steps:
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4, 2i + 2}, {2i + 3, 2i − 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i + 1, 2}, {2i, 1}
Then 2i + 2 is selected and matches 2i − 1:
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4}, {2i + 3}, {2i + 2, 2i − 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i + 1, 2}, {2i, 1}
Lastly, after T12(n − i − 1) steps, the lower part is stabilized and we have
{2n, 2n− 1}, . . . , {2i+ 4, 2i+ 3}, {2i+ 2, 2i − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
l.e.n.
}, . . . , {2i+ 1, 2}, {2i, 1} (3)
2i − 1 is now the lowest eligible node and is ready to become the pivot.
Odd pivot. (3) is the conﬁguration before 2i − 1 (n − 1 ≤ i ≤ 2) becomes the
pivot. After that step, the conﬁguration is
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4, 2i + 3}, {2i + 2}, {2i}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i + 1, 2}, {2i − 1, 1}
After T12(n − i) steps, the w.e.d. stabilizes the lower part:
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4, 2i + 3}, {2i + 2, 2i}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i + 1, 2}, {2i − 1, 1}
Then 2i swaps with 2i + 1 as 2’s mate:
{2n, 2n − 1}, . . . , {2i + 4, 2i + 3}, {2i + 2}, {2i + 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower part
, . . . , {2i, 2}, {2i− 1, 1},
3 For i = n−1, there is only two nodes involved. However, the presented results stand
if we set T12(n) = 0 for any n ≤ 0.
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and after another T12(n − i) steps, the conﬁguration is
{2n, 2n−1}, . . . , {2i+4, 2i+3}, {2i+2, 2i+1}, {2i−2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
l.e.n.
, 2i−3}, . . . , {2i, 2}, {2i−1, 1}.
This is the point where 2i − 2 becomes the next pivot
2 as a pivot. Eventually, 2 is selected and matches with 1. After that, the
w.e.d. performs T12(n − 1) to produce the stable conﬁguration.
We can now verify Equation (2):
T12(n) = 3︸︷︷︸
Initial phase
+
n−1∑
i=2
(2 + T12(n − i) + T12(n − i − 1))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Even pivots
+
n−1∑
i=2
(2 + 2T12(n − i))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Odd pivots
+ 1 + T12(n − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2 as a pivot
= 4 + T12(n − 1) +
∑n−1
i=2 (4 + 3T12(n − i)) +
∑n
i=3 (T12(n − i))
= 4(n − 1) + ∑n−3i=1 4T12(i) + 3T12(n − 2) + T12(n − 1)
Equation and (2) allows us to aﬃrm that T12 follows an asymptotic geometric
progression. Moreover, the asymptotic common ratio can be explicitly found: it
must be a positive solution of Equation (4).
x2 = x1 + 3 +
4
x − 1 (4)
This equation leads to Equation (5), a third degree equation whose only pos-
itive root is the asymptotic common ratio for T12.
x3 = 2x2 + 2x + 1 (5)
Analysis indicates that the positive root of Equation (5) is
λ =
3
√
316 + 12
√
249
6
+
20
3 3
√
316 + 12
√
249
+
2
3
≈ 2.8312
Using Equation (1), we see that T∅ is also Θ(λn). That ends our proof.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that acyclic preference-based systems have a linear round com-
plexity even for the adversarial daemon, and a quadratic step complexity for
the round robin daemon. This means the the self-stabilization of such systems
is good, as long as nodes cannot be eligible and not selected for an arbitrary
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long period of time. These bounds are tight for global p.b.s., but according to a
previous work, the round complexity may be logarithmic for most acyclic p.b.s.
that are not global [12]. On the other hand, the step complexity stands between
Ω(μn) and 2n−1 − 1 for the adversarial daemon. This is a more precise result
than the factorial-like upper bound that can be deduced from the convergence
theorem. Note, that global p.b.s. with complete acceptance graph have been
used whenever we needed to prove that a bound was reached. Thus the global
p.b.s. with complete acceptance graph is a sort of extremum among the possible
acyclic p.b.s., as empirically observed in [12].
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